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“My Way”: Charles Taylor on identity and 
recognition in a secular democracy




How should we evaluate Charles Taylor’s famous essay “e politics of recognition” 
(1992) and other related texts in a time where, at least in Europe, the ideal of a 
“multicultural society” has lost appeal? is article rst tries to set out the way in 
which Taylor links the modern concepts of recognition, identity and authenticity, 
and how he argues why modernity not only demands a politics of equal dignity but 
also a politics of dierence. We also discuss his more recent proposal, rethinking the 
whole idea of secularism and a “secular democracy” – again: to prepare a just and 
workable answer to societies marked by (not only religious) diversity. We conclude 
our contribution with three critical remarks on Taylor’s approach: about the recent 
politicization of culture in Europe and elsewhere, about the necessity of a new role of 
the public domain, and about the core concept of authenticity.
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1. Introduction
In the political arena of my part of the world “multiculturalism” as 
political position or programme nowadays seems hardly tenable.1 In 
1 is article is an elaborated version of a paper that was rst presented at Stellenbosch 
University, Department of eology, at the 14th of August, 2017. I want to thank Alease 
Brown and Judy-Ann Cilliers who commented on the paper on that occasion. Especially 
the comment of Brown strengthened my suspicion that the philosophical vocabulary of 
Charles Taylor on multicultural issues can only be relevant in the South-African context 
when more attention is given to “an acknowledgement of the historical harms that have 
followed as a result of failing to value those of other cultures” (Browns comment, p. 2). 
I can also support (and I presume Taylor would also) the conclusion that “the concept 
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public discourse in countries like France2 and the Netherlands the 
term is mostly used polemically, to describe and discredit a rival in one 
stroke. Without much appreciation for the diverse meanings of the term, 
“multiculturalists” are sometimes considered the naïve supporters of 
political correctness, by others as cultural relativists, or – in France – as 
representatives of a Communautarisme, that refuge of undemocratic or 
even totalitarian forces. Unsurprisingly, the image a Trojan horse being 
hauled in in the name of multicultural policy has constantly cropped up 
over the past few years.
Such framing is of course supercial, and does not go much further than 
rather ephemeral tweets, posts and soundbites. But right from the start, the 
whole idea of a multicultural society has also been the subject of sophisticated 
criticism.3 Ever since the publication of his essay e politics of recognition 
(1992) – possibly his most widely read and certainly most widely translated 
essay – Charles Taylor has been regarded as a philosophical defender of 
multiculturalism. But is that a just assessment? And are the objections to 
of democracy, historically, dating back to classical antiquity even, has been a concept of 
limited participation and control by the few” (Brown, p.3), and that it is quite probable 
that the contemporary democratic model (Brown focuses on the democracy in the 
USA, I was talking about European democracies) and Taylor’s idea of authenticity can 
only be relevant in (South-) Africa with substantial amendments. But I also think that 
Taylor’s communitarian liberalism is more hospitable to ideals like Ubuntu (Brown, p. 
6) than procedural variants of liberalism. I would be very curious to learn about a new, 
post-colonial idea of authenticity and its link to democracy when Larmore’s alternative 
to Taylor’s concept of authenticity (valued by Cilliers in her comment) is criticized as “a 
bit fanciful and idealistic” (I would think this isn’t a disadvantage of it) by Brown. As 
Taylor already recommended, we must “keep on disputing the denition and meaning 
of authenticity”.
2 See for instance Paul Ricoeur, Parcours de la Reconnaissance (Paris: Éditions Stock, 
2004); English translation id, e Course of Recognition (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
London, England: Harvard University Press, 2007), in which he refers to the “highly 
polemical character of a notion such as multiculturalism” (p. 213).
3 For example, ve well-founded critiques from ve dierent viewpoints might include: 
Alain Finkielkraut, La défaite de la pensée (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), Ch. 4 (from within 
French enlightenment thinking); Brian Barry, Culture and Equality. An Egalitarian 
Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) (from 
egalitarian liberalism); Roger Scruton, “In Defence of the Nation”, in e Philosopher 
on Dover Beach (Manchester: Carcanet, 1990, pp. 299–329 (from conservative 
nationalism); Stanley Fish, “Boutique Multiculturalism”, in e Trouble with Principle 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 56–72 (from postmodern 
thinking) and Zygmunt Baumann, Culture in a Liquid Modern World (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2011) (from critical sociological thinking).
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a multi-cultural society, which have become much more clearly delineated 
in the 25 years since Taylor’s essay was published, also applicable to his 
version of his version of multiculturalism?
In e politics of recognition Taylor’s immediate concern is to provide a 
philosophical vocabulary to enable discussion of questions high on the 
agenda of global politics, ones not infrequently the cause of great division: 
how should a liberal, secular democracy have to deal with deep” cultural 
plurality or “diversity”? Which rights and obligations should newly arrived 
people (e.g., immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees) have in their countries of 
arrival, and what are the majority populations in these countries entitled to 
expect and demand? Where lie the boundaries of tolerance within “multi-
coloured” nation states? With this, Taylor is also interested in a genealogical 
and hermeneutic question: how is it that under our modern conditions, we 
so frequently and vehemently speak of identity and recognition, and which 
cultural and moral sensibilities does this betray?
While in 1992 Taylor mostly gave examples from the struggles for the 
(literary) canon at universities and the demand for cultural survival of 
minority cultures and languages (he was personally involved the Quebecan 
struggle), his later texts are concerned with the question of how a secular 
democracy should deal with the diversity of life views and their expressions 
within the public sphere. In this instance again Taylor sees his task as 
primarily that of presenting a conceptual framework, and of formulating 
a few political-ethical principles against a description of their historical 
background in order to enable discussion of concrete matters. Sometimes he 
does, however, go a bit further by also making concrete policy suggestions – 
revealing the politician Taylor had indeed been for a long time.
In this article I will rst set out the systematic core of Taylor’s “politics of 
recognition”, that is, the way he links the concepts recognition, identity and 
authenticity; those concepts by which the modern moral order distinguishes 
itself from traditional, hierarchical societies. It is this connection which 
makes it possible to understand that modernity not only demands a 
“politics of equal dignity”, but also a “politics of dierence”. e question of 
how far a liberal society should go in this regard is explored in section one. 
I argue in section two, that recent debates on religions and other life-views, 
and their public status, led Taylor to propose revision and reconsideration 
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of “secularism” and the principles of secular democracy. In section three I 
conclude by providing a few side notes to his proposals.
2. Recognition, identity and authenticity
e struggle for recognition
In e politics of recognition Taylor sees the need for recognition especially 
reected in the fact that the political agenda now includes the continued 
lack of recognition, appreciation and estimation suered by historically 
marginalised groups. He is concerned with the consequences this has for 
the self-image and life options of, for instance, women, people of colour, 
colonialized peoples and minorities. Later in his text he also refers to Franz 
Fanon’s famous Les damnés de la Terre4, which strongly articulated the 
position that “the major weapon of the colonizers was the imposition of 
their image of the colonized on the subjugated people”5. Fanon makes clear 
that recognition is not a matter of correct form or politeness, but something 
far more fundamental, namely “a vital human need”, one worth dying for. 
In certain instances he even considers violent struggle a necessity.6
Taylor starts o by looking at the historical conditions underlying the 
current struggle for recognition and our sensitivities in this regard. In 
the rst instance, it is in the rise of an egalitarian democratic society and 
a departure from the old hierarchical one where recognition was tied to 
(bringing) tribute, and thus to inequality. We have largely replaced the 
concept of bringing tribute to an elect few with the concept of equal dignity 
which everyone is entitled to as human being and citizen.
e second condition which enabled recognition to gain such crucial 
signicance according to Taylor is the rise of the modern ideal of authenticity 
towards the end of the eighteenth century. is ideal was most strongly 
4 Franz Fanon, Les damnés de la terre (Paris: Maspero, 1961), English tradition e 
Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1975).
5 Charles Taylor, “e politics of Recognition”, in Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism 
and “e Politics of Recognition”, with commentary by Amy Gutmann and others 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 25–73; 65.
6 Taylor, “e Politics of Recognition”, p. 26.
157De Wit  •  STJ 2018, Vol 4, No 1, 153–178
expressed by authors like Herder and Rousseau. ey related the desire for 
recognition to the appreciation of one’s own specic “particularity”.
Taylor’s reference to Herder makes clear that a particular identity is able 
to assume not only individual form, but also a collective one. Herder not 
only posits that every individual has its own “measure”, but also that every 
people has to remain faithful to itself, that is, its own culture.7 Aer all, 
authenticity as moral ideal means that “there is a certain way of being 
human which is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and 
not in imitation of anyone else’s life.”8 “But this notion”, Taylor establishes, 
“gives a new importance to being true to oneself. If I am not, I miss the point 
in my life; I miss what being human is for me.”9 e demand for recognition 
of (my) uniqueness is however not a return to honour-related recognition. 
Aer all, authenticity is also a universalistic ideal and not a demand for 
privilege, or, in Montesquieu’s terminology, for préférences et distinctions.10 
Paul Ricoeur succinctly remarks in his reading of Taylor: “It is collectively, 
one could say, that we demand an individualizing recognition.”11
Taylor discusses the ideal of authenticity a number of times in his oeuvre, 
more recently also its religious version.12 To him, it is an ideal which we 
are no longer able to reverse, since it has been widely embraced since the 
1960s. Whereas this ideal for authenticity is a legacy of Romanticism,13 the 
demand for the equal dignity of all humans and citizens is rather a fruit of 
the Enlightenment. Later in his text Taylor specically refers to Kant and 
the liberal tradition. In his attempts to do justice to both the Romantic 
7 Taylor, “e Politics of Recognition”, p. 31.
8 Taylor, “e Politics of Recognition”, p. 30.
9 Taylor, “e Politics of Recognition”, p. 30.
10 Taylor, “e Politics of Recognition”, p. 27.
11 Ricoeur, e Course, p. 214.
12 See Charles Taylor, e Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, 
England: Harvard University Press, 1991); A Secular Age (Cambridge: e Bellknap 
Press, 2007), Ch.13, “e Age of Authenticity”, pp. 473–505, in which he frequently 
ideal-typically also speaks of the “post-Durkheimian period”, one in which religious 
authenticity is no longer coupled to political, especially national identity (as in the 
“neo-Durkheimian model”), but has become a personal quest. Further Taylor, “e 
Future of the Religious Past”, in Hent de Vries (ed.), Religion: Beyond a Concept (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2008), pp. 178–245; especially 207 .
13 See Charles Larmore, e Romantic Legacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), especially Ch. 3, “Irony and authenticity”, pp. 65–97.
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and Enlightement traditions, the Canadian also here shows himself a 
synthesizing thinker.14
e two traditions have also engendered two forms of politics and political 
struggle, a politics of equal dignity and a politics of dierence. Already in 
1992 Taylor was keenly aware that the tension between these two traditions 
could lead to conicting claims and dierences of opinion when it came 
to the implications, reach and boundaries of both forms of politics. Yet he 
maintained that the two forms are compatible, and to some extent even 
interwoven. Both are concerned with the idea of dignity and its implications 
for equality.15 Just as much as we want to be recognized as the equal of 
others, we also want to be appreciated as particular persons or collectives 
with our own characters or “identities”.
According to Taylor the notion of recognition presupposes the essentially 
“dialogical” and “linguistic” character of human life, and thus the diverse 
ways we understand and express ourselves. ere is no such thing as 
monologically dening my authentic identity: precisely then, when we 
follow our “inner voice”, we want others, and especially “signicant” 
others, to recognize our choices, be it tacitly, by means of open dialogue, 
in negotiation or by disagreement. Aer all, identity cannot be completely 
separated from one’s roots, “where we come from”, and from a horizon of 
meaning, which, to Taylor, is “inescapable” for every human being.16 What 
never ceases to be true, however, is that recognition could falter, and be met 
with refusal or lack of appreciation. Particularly in modern conditions, we 
are all at risk of becoming the “victims” (Taylor)17 of someone or society. A 
refusal to recognize our uniqueness is experienced as a form of oppression. 
is is especially true with regard to intimate relationships which, not by 
chance, are seen as the key to self-discovery and self-appreciation. Taylor, 
however, largely concentrates on the two forms of politics of recognition in 
the public sphere.
14 See eo de Wit, “Tussen Scylla en Charybdis”, in Ger Groot & Guido Vanheeswijck 
(red.), Charles Taylor (Utrecht: Klement, 2018), pp. 123–147, on Taylor’s synthetical 
political philosophy.
15 See Ricoeur, e Course, p. 214.
16 Taylor, “e Politics of Recognition”, p. 33, and e Ethics of Authenticity, p. 31.
17 Taylor, “e Politics of Recognition”, p. 26.
159De Wit  •  STJ 2018, Vol 4, No 1, 153–178
e politics of equal dignity and the politics of dierence
e two forms of politics of recognition may well have dignity as common 
denominator, but as soon as we raise the question of what exactly 
constitutes dignity, an important dierence emerges between the struggles 
for equality on the one hand, and for the right to dier, or to be dierent, 
on the other. In the framework of a politics of equal dignity, respect is paid 
to a universal potency, in Kant, for instance, the ability to make use of one’s 
rational faculties and to subject oneself to rational principles.18 With equal 
civil rights now the objective, discrimination on the basis of gender, race 
or religion has become taboo. Also “positive discrimination” favouring 
historically disadvantaged groups in the population, could be legitimized 
from such a politics, for instance as mechanism to level the playing eld.
In the framework of a “politics of dierence”, on the other hand, more 
is at play than the recognition of a universal human potential, or purely 
the power to dene one’s identity as person or group. At stake is the right 
to cherish the incarnation of this power in a culture or a religion, and to 
seek to protect and perpetuate it. us, the French Canadians demanded 
the right to promulgate legislation to ensure that there would still be 
French-speaking Canadians in future. In a politics of dierence, it is not 
discrimination, but assimilation into a homogenous culture that is the 
“cardinal sin”.19
It is on this point where these two forms of politics – as Taylor frankly 
admits – can come into conict with one another. As soon as the politics of 
dierence draws into question the “neutrality” of the politics of equality by 
posing that “the supposedly neutral set of dierence-blind principles of the 
politics of equal dignity is in fact a reection of one hegemonic culture”20, 
universality may turn into a masked particularity. In the name of this kind 
of equality the particularity of minority cultures are oppressed and forced 
into the straightjacket of a homogenous unity.
18 See especially Immanuel Kant, Schrien zur Ethik und Religionsphilosophie (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaliche Buchgesellscha, 1983), Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 
where he develops our rational capacity to follow the categorical imperative: “Handle 
so, dass die maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als prinzip einer allegemeinen 
gesetzgebung gelten könne” (p. 140)
19 Taylor, “e Politics of Recognition”, p. 38.
20 Taylor, “e Politics of Recognition”, p. 43.
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is grave allegation Taylor thinks not undeserved in the case of 
Rousseau’s model of equality politics. Aer all, Rousseau espoused an – 
also enforced – amalgamation of individual wills into the “common will”.21 
In the case of a Kantian inspired politics of equality, matters are more 
nuanced because he skipped the dependence on the Volonté Genérale 
and Rousseau’s demand for the total absence of dierentiated roles. us 
Taylor,by drawing on examples from the earlier mentioned struggle of the 
French-speaking Canadians and also that of the Canadian First Peoples 
for cultural survival, distinguishes two “incompatible” versions of a liberal 
politics of equality. In the version of “procedural liberalism”, individual 
rights and non-discriminatory measures always trump collective ones 
such as cultural survivance. e version termed “substantive liberalism” 
by Taylor posits that a liberal society could indeed be organised around a 
particular description of the good life. For example, Francophone Canada 
wishing to be recognized as a “distinct society”.
According to this notion “a liberal society distinguishes itself as such by 
the way in which it treats minorities, including those who do not share 
public denitions of the good, and above all by the rights it accords to all 
of its members.”22 Taylor here has in mind basic rights such as that of life, 
freedom, due process, free expression of opinion, freedom of religion, etc. 
Although he acknowledges that the practical application of the substantive 
version could be accompanied by “tensions and diculties”, he thinks it 
allows one better to deal with the dierences in our multicultural societies 
than a procedural version, one “inhospitable” to dierences, and therefore 
unable to avoid the reproach of being a homogenising force.
e boundary of a politics of dierence: against political correctness
It would therefore seem that Taylor – true to his “communitarianism”, 
and his embrace of the modern ideal of authenticity – is justly viewed as a 
21 Taylor, “e Politics of Recognition”, p. 51: “In Rousseau, three things seem to be 
inseparable: freedom (nondomination), the absence of dierentiated roles, and a very 
tight common purpose”. And Taylor comments: “is has been the formula for the 
most terrible forms of homogenizing tyranny, starting with the Jacobins and extending 
to the totalitarian regimes of our century.” See also my “Tussen Scylla en Charibdys” in 
Ger Groot et al Charles Taylor, especially the section entitled “Jacobijns-republikeinse 
interne uitsluiting en Rousseau’s Volonté Générale”, pp. 140–143.
22 Taylor, “e Politics of Recognition”, p. 59.
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proponent of a multicultural politics of dierence, albeit in a very specic 
sense. He defends (at least in the case of Francophone Quebec) a liberal 
politics which is not masked, but openly comes out for specic collective 
goals. And more in general he is of the opinion that western liberalism 
constitutes no neutral ground on which cultures could meet. Amongst 
other reasons,23 this is because the liberal tradition is partly a result of Latin 
Christianity. In other words: “Liberalism is also a ghting creed”.24 is 
aspect came strongly to the fore during the Salman Rushdie aair,25 when 
it became apparent that the separation of religion and politics was not in 
the least something to be taken for granted in Islam. Western liberalism 
had to “draw the line”, since rights such as that of life and of freedom of 
expression were at stake.26 Confronted with a call to murder “compromise 
is close to impossible here”.27 But does this mean that in Taylor’s liberal 
society one could simply say to newcomers: “is is how things are done 
here, take it or leave”?
Both his embrace of the ethical ideal of authenticity and his political 
insight that a nationalism, which draws inspiration from this ideal “could 
break up” multi-national societies, however forces Taylor to pose a more 
incisive question. In as far as a refusal of recognition (of both personal 
23 e division of church and state, Taylor argues for example, “goes back to the earliest 
days of Christian civilization”. (p. 62)
24 Taylor, “e Politics of Recognition”, p. 62.
25 In 1989, Salman Rushdie learned that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had issued 
the extraordinary fatwa calling on Muslims all over the world to murder him and 
everyone else who had contributed to the publication of his latest novel, e Satanic 
Verses. For more than ten years, Rushdie lived under the surveillance of bodyguards, 
special drivers, and complicated police arrangements, until the British security experts 
nally determined that Iran’s secret services and the Islamic Republic’s Lebanese allies 
in Hezbollah no longer seemed to be elding hit squads against him, and the risk of 
assassination had subsided to less than alarming levels.
26 Taylor here (p. 62) refers to a 1989 opinion piece by Larry Siedentop regarding western 
liberalism’s “Christian connection”. In the meantime, Siedentop has expanded his 
original article into a book: L. Siedentop, Inventing the Individual. e Origins of 
Western Liberalism (London: Penguin Books, 2015).
27 is remark resulted in a critical reprimand by Brian Barry: that “compromise is close 
to impossibble here – one either forbids murder or allows it” as Taylor had written (p. 
63) to Barry testies to “a sad lack of imagination”. By this logic, the British government 
could have settled with Iran “to remove some agreed portion of his anatomy – say the 
right arm”. Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 298. By the way, on this point they were in 
agreement: in this case a compromise was unthinkable.
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and collective identity) could be very harmful in multicultural and 
multinational societies, does this not imply that we should also recognize 
the equal value of other (sub)cultures and their traditions? Taylor’s answer 
here is nuanced – already in 1992 he was acutely aware that we were 
here confronted with a pitfall of political correctness, a serious form of 
paternalism. “All the drawings are equally nice” my kindergarten used to 
say at the end of drawing period. With this she of course wanted to prop up 
the self-image of all her charges, but even as kids we understood that it was 
nothing but a well-intended lie.
A value judgement on the cultural accomplishments and traditions of 
other (sub)cultures, thus Taylor’s answer, could of course not be made a 
priori. Such a value judgement demands a certain willingness, an “act of 
faith”28 to seriously investigate those cultures – including our own western 
one – which have animated whole societies over long periods of time, in an 
attempt to broaden one’s own horizons and to revise one’s own standards. 
Only by means of this hermeneutic labour could one for instance revise 
the literary canon, and then not by means of an ethical imperative which 
in advance obliges a positive judgement. A half-baked positive judgement 
would not only be humiliating but also ethnocentric, even homogenising, 
“for it implies that we already possess the criteria with which to make such 
judgments.”29
Should one then rather abandon one’s intention to take other cultures 
seriously, and simply demand assimilation into the established dominant 
order? at is an attitude Taylor in 1992 saw represented in the opponents 
of multi-culturalism, one which has since then become fairly common 
amongst European politicians, policy-makers and intellectuals. And here 
Isaiah Berlin’s remark30 that Taylor is a “teleologically thinking Christian” 
28 Taylor, “e politics of Recognition”, p. 66. us Herman De Dijn’s agreement on this 
point, “Politiek van de erkenning en multiculturalisme”, in Stefaan E. Cuypers & Willen 
Lemmens (red.), Charles Taylor: een mozaïek van zijn Denken (Pelckmans, 1997), pp. 
141–57; 151: “Taylor’s thought that traditions deserve appreciation seems justied to 
me”.
29 Taylor, “e Politics of Recognition”, p. 71.
30 Sir Isaiah Berlin, “Introduction”, in: James Tully (ed.), Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism. 
e Philosophy of Charles Taylor in Question (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), pp. 1–3, 1. It is common knowledge that Taylor is a Roman Catholic, who defends 
a “catholic modernity”, the most explicit in “A Catholic Modernity?”, in James L. He 
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indeed cuts the ice. Ultimately Taylor’s willingness to take other cultures 
seriously from an assumption “of equal worth” is theologically inspired. 
It is no coincidence that he refers to Herder, who “had a view of divine 
providence, according to which all this variety of culture was not merely 
accident but was meant to bring about a greater harmony. I can’t rule out 
such a view.”31
3. e basic principles of secular democracy
As mentioned earlier, a modern democracy which derives its legitimacy 
from the sovereignty of the people not only requires basic rights and 
just processes, but also patriotism, the bond experienced with a specic 
community. Such a democracy cannot allow itself to alienate any particular 
population groups; no second-class citizens should ever be created. e 
ideal of authenticity adds further weight to this task. It seems to provide 
both newcomers and patriots the moral right to live out their identities, 
rooted in their own particular horizons of meaning. As Taylor frequently 
emphasises, authenticity aer all presupposes a horizon of meaning and 
values which transcend the individual, and which also makes demands 
upon him or her.32 But could solidarity with a democratic community 
be reconciled with following “one’s own way” and particular horizons 
of meaning? is question has been raised from all sides over the past 
decades, and with ever-increasing urgency.
Especially during the last decade Taylor felt obliged to re-examine the 
ideas of “secularism” (laïcité) and “secular state”, no doubt also due to 
the fact that religious identities and demands emanating from a religious 
horizon of meaning have been moving up on the global political agenda. 
e Rushdie aair in 1989 was for many observers the start of a new era of 
religious wars, or of “the clash of civilizations”, increasingly dened along 
(quasi-)religious fault lines.
(ed), Charles Taylor, A Catholic Modenity. Charles Taylor’s Mariansit Award Lecture, 
with responses by William M. Shea et al. (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp. 13–37.
31 Taylor, “e Politics of Recognition”, p. 72.
32 Taylor, e Ethics of Authenticity, especially “Inescapable Horizons”, pp. 31–41.
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Taylor’s political-philosophical interventions in this regard are twofold. 
First of all, he proposes redening of the concept “secular state”.33 He then, 
in collaboration with his Canadian colleague Jocelyn Maclure, compiled 
and elaborated a number of principles for dealing with moral and religious 
diversity in practice.34 I will briey discuss the core of both interventions.
In both interventions Taylor proposes that we detach our idea of 
“secularism” and secular democracy from a xation on religion, one rooted 
in circumstances peculiar to western history. e long struggle to forge 
a secular state started in the United States and France, both contexts in 
which versions of the Christian religion were dominant. In these contexts, 
“secular” came to mean that the state no longer retains any bond with 
any specic creed (or retains purely a ceremonial bond), and in this 
sense, becomes “neutral”. e word “secular” is somewhat “ethnocentric”, 
establishes Taylor, for aer all, it originally referred to developments within 
(early) Christianity.35
In both France and America this xation on religion has led to the 
misconception that only “reason” – or rational laïcité – could provide 
the foundation for the state’s intercourse with, and control of creeds 
and religions. is conception is seen by Taylor in France in the Jacobin 
tradition, and in the United States in the early works of John Rawls.
33 Charles Taylor, “Why we need a Radical Redenition of Secularism”, in E. Mendieta and 
J. Vanantwerpen (ed.), e Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), pp. 34–59. Also see Taylor, “What does Secularism Mean?”, 
in Dilemmas and Connections. Selected Essays (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, 
England, 2011), pp. 303–325; and Taylor, “How to dene Secularism?”, in Alfred Stepan 
and Charles Taylor (ed.), Boundaries of Toleration (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2014), pp. 59–79. e last two texts largely overlap with the article mentioned 
rst.
34 Jocely Maclure & Charles Taylor, Laïcité et liberté de conscience (Montreal: Les Éditions 
du Boréal, 2010); I quote from the English translation: Secularism and Freedom of 
Conscience (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Harvard University Press, 
2011).
35 See for instance M. Riedl’s recent investigation (“e Secular Sphere in Western 
eology: a Historical Reconsideration”, in P. Losonczi et al (ed.), e Future of 
Political eology (England: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 11–22, in which he defends the position 
that secularisation (in the sense of desacralisation) of political power already found 
“completion” in the church fathers of North-Africa, especially St Augustine – only 
aer the Church’s reversal of fortunes under Emperor Constantine turn did a “re-
spritualizing” of politics emerge.
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Ironically enough, in France this conception has led to laïcité becoming a 
kind of “rational theology”. A situation similar to Kemal Atatürk’s Turkey 
never having been a truly secular state, but much rather a form of state-
laïcité with all the trappings of a civil religion. In a recent book Martha 
Nussbaum describes the French laïcité-system as “the establishment of 
non-religion”.36 From within a xation on religion, it was assumed that the 
practical problems of a multicultural context could be resolved by the strict 
application of mantras such as laïcité, “separation of church and state”, or 
“Wall of Separation”.
According to Taylor the real dilemmas only become visible when one a) 
broadens “secularism”, and redenes it as the proper way of interacting 
with the “diversity” of life views, and b) accept that several principles are 
at play when we are looking for answers to concrete issues engendered by 
the practice of actual co-existence.37 Such a redening would rst of all 
entail that the state’s “neutrality” is not only accorded to religion, but, in 
Rawls’ words, extended to “all comprehensive views of the good”. Secondly, 
in terms of the relevant principles, Taylor and Maclure make a distinction 
between crucial moral principles, and the institutional arrangements 
which enable their realization.
ey mention two major moral principles: the equal moral worth of all 
citizens (in other words, equal respect accorded by the state to all its citizens), 
and freedom of conscience. anks to two institutional arrangements, 
implementation of these principles is also possible. In pluralistic societies, 
separation of church and state is meant to guarantee equal dignity, while 
the state’s neutrality is to see to it that certain (groups of) citizens are not 
relegated to second-class citizens or suer any restraint of conscience. 
e state identies itself with no particular life view. And its laws can no 
more decree that: “whereas the Bible tells us that”, than: “whereas Marx 
has shown that religion is the opium of the people” or: “whereas Kant has 
shown that the only thing good without qualication is a good will”.38
36 Martha Nussbaum, e New Religious Intolerance. Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an 
Anxious Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Dutch translation, De 
nieuwe intolerantie: een uitweg uit de politiek van de angst (Amsterdam: Ambo, 2013), 
p. 116 and p. 157.
37 “Why we need”, p. 36.
38 “Why we need”, p. 50; Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, pp. 75–80.
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e fact that the interpretation of these institutional arrangements could 
evidently dier from context to context, shows us that in multi-religious 
contexts we are dealing with real dilemmas. us, one could argue that a 
Muslim teacher at a (European) public school wearing a headscarf harms 
the school’s neutrality, thus infringing on the norm that public institutions 
treat all citizens exactly the same. But would banning headscarves in 
this context not constitute a violation of the freedom of religion and 
conscience, and in certain instances, even equal opportunities for all 
citizens?39 at France, Germany and the United Kingdom have come 
to dierent conclusions in this matter,40 shows how the interpretation of 
institutional principles can dier, sometimes fundamentally so. Laïcité and 
the “separation of church and state” therefore are no magic words with 
which to settle moral dilemmas. According to Taylor, the only possibly 
remaining watchword is to continue striving for “maximal compatibility”.
Maclure and Taylor name two further moral principles, both strongly 
interwoven with Taylor’s political-philosophical position.41 His third 
principle holds that in the development of the “political identity” of a 
society and its juridical consequences, “all spiritual families must be 
heard”, while the fourth principle asks of us “to maintain relations of 
harmony and comity between the supports of dierent religions and 
Weltanschauungen”.42 While Maclure and Taylor view the last two moral 
principles as concretising the fraternité of the French Revolution, the rst 
two may be said to correspond to the liberté and egalité of the famous 
French trinity.
Indeed, when modern democracy, which – more than pre-modern and 
authoritarian political congurations – is based on a “people” as deliberating 
unit with a “will” and a “political identity”, and furthermore on “trust” 
amongst its citizens (Taylor’s terms for describing Western democracy)43 – 
39 See especially Micheline Milot, La Laïcité (Ottawa: Novalis, 2008).
40 Taylor remembers us that in France, pupils and teachers were forbidden the headscarf, 
in certain German Länder, pupils can wear it, but not teachers, while in the UK 
and other countries (like the Netherlands, TdW) there is no general verdict, but the 
individual schools can decide. (“Why we need”, 41)
41 See my “Tussen Scylla en Charybdis”, in Groot, Charles Taylor, pp. 123–146.
42 “Why we need”, p. 35.
43 “Why we need”, pp. 43–44.
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then fraternity and a willingness to listen are indeed estimable democratic 
virtues.
At the same time, the seduction of a certain “fetishizing” of political identity 
becomes understandable. In contemporary France for instance, Taylor sees 
the tendency to elevate laïcité to the position of something “untouchable”, 
with a “quasi-sacred status”.44 is tendency he calls “very understandable”, 
but also “one illustration of a general truth: that contemporary democracies, 
as they progressively diversify, will have to undergo redenitions of their 
historical identities, which may be far-reaching and painful.”45 Aer all, by 
“fetishizing” any specic incarnation of political identity, one runs the risk 
of repressing the moral dilemmas of a truly pluralist society, and thereby 
of undermining the possibility of peaceful co-existence in diversity. Rawls’ 
model of political identity based on the overlapping consensus achieved by 
the voices of atheists, agnostics, Muslims, Catholics and many more life 
views also being heard, could, according to Taylor, be useful in redening 
a political identity: “We are condemned to live an overlapping consensus”.46 
Taylor proposes the same model in the search for a peaceful international 
consensus on human rights.47
4. ree side notes
I conclude with three side notes on Taylor’s thinking on identity and 
democratic legitimacy, all three of which raise doubts concerning his 
version of a multi-cultural politics of recognition. e rst concerns the 
unforeseeable consequences of politicising cultural heritages, the second 
the task of the democratic state in a society marked by “deep diversity”, 
while the third looks at the limitations of Taylor’s ideal of authenticity.
44 “Why we need”, p. 46.
45 “Why we need”, p. 46.
46 “Why we need”, p. 48; and Taylor and Maclure, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, 
p. 107.
47 Charles Taylor, “Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights”, in: 
Dilemmas and Connections, pp. 105–123; 105 and 122,
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e politicisation of culture
I started this contribution with the statement that to most political 
parties in Europe, multi-culturalism as political programme had lost its 
appeal. e multi-cultural society has lost its former shine, it has become 
problematic and burdensome. In phenomenological approaches, societies 
like ours are frequently described in stark terms as a fragmented reality, 
like a “broken window pane” lying on the ground, while the fragments 
intentionally and unintentionally damage one another.48 In such a society 
the politeness between the major spiritual families which Taylor considers 
so essential in our permanent quest for collective identity, has become 
displaced by a grim assertiveness – one which sometimes spills over into 
daydreams entertaining the disappearance of the strange, annoying or 
dangerous other. And not infrequently, these daydreams culminate in the 
demand for greater homogeneity, one not based on the vision of a multi-
coloured future, but on nostalgia for a vanished state of greater uniformity.
In A Secular Age (2007) also Taylor recognizes that the “secular times” in 
which we live constitute an era in which diverse religions and anti-religions 
are quick to irritate or make another “fragile” – “naïve” belief or un-belief 
has become a rarity.49 In light of this recent development, Taylor’s plea for 
a “politics of dierence” at a rst glance appears naïve. It seems to have 
seriously underestimated one potential consequence. e willingness to 
accommodate minorities, immigrants and historically disadvantaged 
groups by sympathetically investigating their cultural uniqueness from the 
perspective of a new common value horizon, not only brings into play these 
groups, but also the native populations and ethnocentrists of the various 
host nations.
Already in the 1980s, Jean-Marie Le Pen – then leader of the far-right Front 
National, which he would remain until passing the baton to his daughter 
Marine in 2011 – had an acute feel for appropriating the arguments of 
multi-culturalists, thus avoiding explicitly espousing – no longer publicly 
tolerated – racist notions. “You defend the right to be dierent? So, do we!” 
Listening to Le Pen and his contemporary ilk in many European countries, 
48 is is the image used by for instance Rudi Visker: eo de Wit, “De samenleving is een 
gebroken ruit”, Filosoe Magazine 5/2008, pp. 56–58.
49 Taylor, Een seculiere tijd, pp. 55, 729.
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one hears: “People cannot be simply qualied as superior or inferior. ey 
are dierent, and one has to take into account these physical and cultural 
dierences.”50 e underlying principle of multi-culturalism (the “right to 
dier”), inclusive of a romantic concept of culture (“our utterances are by 
necessity the expressions of a certain culture”), is being endorsed, just as 
in Taylor – with the salient dierence that the political conclusions of the 
extreme far-right and that of the hospitable multi-culturalist diametrically 
dier. e conclusion these representatives of a “racism without race” 
arrive at, is that it would be a tragic error to allow societies from dierent 
civilizations to live amongst one another, for clashes would then become 
unavoidable. “France for the French”, “own people rst”, etc now become 
the slogans. And thus, multiculturism ips over into the culturalism of the 
native majority.
Also, a recent diagnosis of the past American elections puts the nger on 
the boomerang-eect of the rhetoric of diversity. Whoever in the US – like 
Hillary Clinton – comes up for (disadvantaged) groups, “better name them 
all”, writes the American political philosopher Mark Lilla, “otherwise 
those not mentioned may notice, and take exception. at explains what 
has now happened with the white working class and people with strong 
religious convictions.51
us, the net-result of a politics of diversity ultimately threatens to 
culminate in a society where everyone is able to feel him- or herself a 
victim – minorities of majorities, but also vice versa. In my opinion, 
this evolution is strengthened by the dominance of a liberalism which 
has abandoned the idea that any consensus regarding “the good life” is 
possible, and now only appeals to a negative consensus: not to harm one 
another – in other words, John Stuart Mill’s famous harm-principle. In line 
with this, the Dutch sociologist of law Hans Boutellier in 1993 pleaded for 
a “liberalism of the victim”, in which victimhood would be the “ag” of 
50 Jean-Marie Le Pen, Quoted in Pierre-André Taguie, “Réexions sur la question 
antiraciste”, in: Lignes. Revue no. 12, “Penser le racisme”, Dec. 1990, pp. 5–53; 42.
51 Mark Lilla, “Stop met dat rampzalige vieren van verschillen”, in NRC-Handelsblad, 
6-12-2016, pp. 16–17.
170 De Wit  •  STJ 2018, Vol 4, No 1, 153–178
a kind of minimum-morality. With this, society is implicitly viewed as a 
collection of potential victims rather than a community of citizens.52
As noted earlier, Taylor has always resisted this kind of liberalism, and 
maybe in the meantime has also come to agree with Lilla that a politics 
of identity is “more about bearing testimony than about convincing”, and 
that national politics should be concerned not with “the dierence”, but 
with what is held in common. at would bring to the fore those who best 
express the American vision of a shared destiny.”53
e state and the public domain in pluralistic societies
Under conditions of “deep” pluralism, Taylor’s secular-democratic state 
certainly faces a complex task. It has to allow all families of life views to 
be heard without itself becoming partisan, forge an overlapping consensus 
and political identity which allows all citizens to experience themselves 
as part of the political community, while simultaneously allowing every 
citizen to nd his or her own orientation without becoming paternalistic 
or intrusive. Taylor’s state has much in common with that of his French 
colleague Marcel Gauchet, to whom the contemporary state most of all 
needs to be “gymnastic”: as a discrete, no longer eminent, but denitely 
“solid” transcendent power it needs to ensure that particular identities do 
not oppress one another, and that co-existence remains possible.” 54
In our turbulent times (the threat of terror, the rise of authoritarian 
regimes), how could the solidity of the state be reinforced? Of greatest 
importance is that the public domain functions well. Taylor describes 
the public domain, a central characteristic of democratic societies, as “a 
common space” in which members of society meet, whether face to face, or 
by means of a variety of (printed and electronic) media.55
52 Hans Boutellier, Solidariteit en slachtoerschap. De morele betekenis van criminaliteit 
in een postmoderne cultuur (Nijmegen: SUN, 1993); and my analysis: . de Wit, “De 
Assepoester van het strafrecht bevrijden. Over de geboorte van het slachtoerpopulisme 
uit de geest van het postmodernisme”, in J. Ouwerkerk et al, Hoe te reageren op misdaad? 
(Den Haag: Sdu uitgevers, 2013), pp. 51–66.
53 Lilla, “Stop met dat rampzalige vieren van verschillen”, p. 17.
54 Marcel Gauchet, La Religion dans la Démocratie. Parcours de la laïcité (Paris: Gallimard, 
1998).
55 Taylor, “Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere”, in: Taylor, Philosophical Arguments 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1995), pp. 257–287; 259.
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On this point, Taylor’s approach could benet from elaboration and 
correction from the Republican tradition (in which tradition the Canadian 
philosopher wants to be placed!), a tradition with great sensitivity for the 
formal and ritual aspects of the democratic constitutional state and the 
public domain. In this tradition, democracy and the constitutional state’s 
exclusive task are to give expression to all of society’s opinions and positions. 
ey also full a wholly unique role, by imposing a specic format to social 
dierences and conicts. at is why someone like Hannah Arendt speaks 
of the political space as a space of appearance, a theatre in which citizens, 
by means of words or deeds, act in the presence of others.56 Freedom is 
not so much an attribute or possession of individuals acting within this 
space, but rather something which takes place between them; aer all, in 
the arguments and exchange of perspectives, something new may be born.57 
Also justice is more than the solidied expression of the dominant sense 
of justice or the current portrayal of man, at the same time it constitutes 
a format which gives space to parties by simultaneously separating and 
uniting them, whereby the law also becomes a factor in our experience and 
understanding of ourselves.58
All of this becomes of even greater importance in a pluralistic society which 
has embraced Taylor’s ideal of authenticity, and where one’s own identity is 
being individually or collectively experienced and expressed. As such, the 
public spaces threaten to become the extension or enlargement of individual, 
particular meanings, collective identities or chosen religions: whoever 
makes the biggest noise determines the political agenda. is tendency is 
further strengthened by the currently advancing (populist) conception of 
democracy whereby it is viewed as a direct reection of the popular will, 
without the “static interference” of mediating authorities or representative 
56 Hannah Arendt, e Human Condition (Chicago and London: e University of 
Chicago Press, 1958), V, “Action”, especially p. 28, “Power and the Space of Appearance”, 
pp. 199–207.
57 Hannah Arendt, e Human Condition, and Rudi Visker, Lof der Zichtbaarheid. Een 
uitleiding in de hedendaagse wijsbegeerte, (Amsterdam: SUN), especially Chapter 1, pp. 
33–68.
58 For this conception, see Dorien Pessers, De rechtsstaat voor beginners (Amsterdam: 
Balans, 2011); and .W.A. de Wit, “De publieke ruimte: geluidsversterker of 
bliksemaeider? Over de omgang met (anti-)religieuze diversiteit”, in; Rudi te Velde 
(red.), Tussen geloof en ongeloof. Religie en geloof in een seculiere Wêreld (Nijmegen: 
Valkhof Pers, 2015), pp. 69–89.
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bodies. In today’s turbulent times it may well be democracy’s salvation if the 
expressivist idea of freedom and authenticity was to nd its counter-balance 
in democracy seen as ritual and “cult”59, of a public sphere in which we need 
to learn to develop some distance to our secular, religious and anti-religious 
identities in order to get down to tackling society’s practical problems.
5. Authenticity: the inheritances of Romanticism
e focus on diversity, Lilla establishes in his earlier-quoted diagnosis of 
the US Presidential election, “in our schools and press has brought forth 
a generation of narcissist liberalists who remain unaware of conditions 
outside of their dened groups, and who do not feel themselves in the least 
called upon to reach out a hand to Americans of all sorts and sizes.” With 
this I have arrived at my third marginal note, the lurking potential reverse 
of a morality of authenticity. From the start Taylor was aware of potential 
shadow sides – narcissism, hedonism, egocentrism, sentimentalism. In 
e Ethics of Authenticity he dedicated a whole chapter to the ideal of 
authenticity’s “slide” towards “subjectivism”.60
e central, and also politically important point of criticism of authenticity-
turned-subjectivism, is time and again that the concentration on one’s own 
or our own identity promotes an instrumental approach to common reality: 
does this world and this society give me the space in which to be myself? 
And how could I make society conform to me, thus allowing me to also 
gild my rights to uniqueness and feeling secure? Responsive politics and 
authorities therefore oen tend to lean towards therapeutic management 
interventions aimed at keeping intact the self-esteem of society’s diverse 
groups.61
59 Also see: Marin Terpstra, Democratie als cultus. Over politiek en religie (Amsterdam: 
Boom, Amsterdam, 2010).
60 Taylor, e Ethics of Authenticity, “e Slide to Subjectivism”, pp. 55–71.
61 See Frank Furedi’s critique of a certain “sliding” of tolerance into therapeutical care in 
his On Tolerance: A Defense of Moral Independence (London and New York: Continuum, 
2011).
173De Wit  •  STJ 2018, Vol 4, No 1, 153–178
In order not to lose the baby of the ideal of authenticity along with the bath 
water of “the ghettoizing”62 of identities, Taylor introduces the following 
distinction. In as far as the manner or the way in which one embraces a life 
goal or -view is concerned, authenticity does indeed refer to oneself: it is my 
choice, my orientation. But that does not at all mean that also the content 
of this orientation needs to refer to myself – as was already hinted at by 
Taylor’s reference to “inescapable horizons of meaning”. Moreover, Taylor 
is of the opinion that we only nd true fullment in something which has 
meaning separately from ourselves and our desires, such as a political 
cause, nature, our heritage, or God. ese referents have meanings which 
transcend one’s own choices and will.63
It is not without political signicance that My Way – Frank Sinatra’s 
famous ode to the ideal of authenticity – was later also appropriated by 
the anarchic British punk band Sex Pistols, if admittedly in a racier 
version. is – admittedly somewhat anecdotal – fact illustrates that the 
ideal of authenticity in our part of the world – in Taylor’s opinion even 
world-wide64 – has become well-nigh inescapable. Even a conservative 
commentator of Taylor’s theory of recognition like the Belgian philosopher 
Herman De Dijn has to admit that “it is nowadays virtually impossible 
not to be inuenced by this quest.”65 I suspect it is as a result of the serious 
shadow sides of identity politics and the – misunderstood – ideal of 
authenticity that, towards the end of e Ethics of Authenticity, Taylor calls 
upon us to keep on disputing the denition and meaning of authenticity.66 
I therefore here give a hint – nothing more – at a potentially alternative 
conception of authenticity.
Towards the end of his study on the inheritance of Romanticism, Charles 
Larmore makes a statement which gives a radical twist to the ideal of 
authenticity – which he, just like Taylor, rst sees expressed in Rousseau 
62 at is the term used by Taylor in “Interculturalism or Multiculturalism?”, paper 
delivered on 4 June 2013, published in Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 38, no. 4–5 
(May 2012): 413–424; 413.
63 Taylor, e Ethics of Authenticity, pp. 81–82.
64 Taylor, e Ethics of Authenticity, p. 74, where he speaks of “one of the important 
potentialities of human life”.
65 Herman de Dijn, “Politiek van de erkenning”, p. 144.
66 Taylor, e Ethics of Authenticity, p. 73.
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and Herder. For this he turns to Romantic authors like Stendhal, Heinrich 
von Kleist and Marcel Proust. ey do not conceive of authenticity as “going 
one’s own way” – in other words, not living one’s life to the expectations 
of others – on the basis of self-chosen goals or ideals, but rather pointing 
towards a sensitivity or openness to the surprises which life has in store, 
in other words, a certain passivity or receptivity. us, Stendhal not only 
opposes authenticity – le naturel in his words – to the expectations of 
others, but also to “l’esprit de l’analyse”, that is, to reexivity. Authenticity 
is therefore a matter of being sensitive to the unexpected, akin to being in 
love.67 Especially in a later article on this question Larmore invokes this 
tradition against Rawls’ ethical rationalism and its central notion of a “life 
plan” which we are supposed to develop and live by.68
In this light, also Taylor’s authenticity ideal remains too one-sidedly 
rationalistic. As Larmore puts it: a life worth living is “a life that is not just 
led but met with as well”, one which also plays havoc with our plans. And 
that not only because, once we try and realise them, all our major life plans 
remain precarious undertakings, but – more fundamentally – because we 
miss out on something of great importance when we only view life as a 
matter of prudence, prevention and control.69
is “unexpected” is also at the centre of gravity of the substantial oeuvre 
produced by George Bataille – a twentieth century French surrealist, 
romantic and “pupil” of Nietzsche – and who, by the way, is not mentioned 
by Larmore. Bataille’s numerous texts70 – on almost every conceivable 
topic – all essentially point to the same: we humans are not only “servile” 
beings (human capital aimed at the future, concerned with and striving 
towards a rationally transparent world), but also “sovereign” ones (aimed 
at useless pursuits; self-giving, self-overspilling, self-losing, thrill-seeking, 
playful, art-making, death-fascinated, Dionysian). As motto for his 
67 Larmore, e Romantic Legacy, p. 86.
68 Also see Charles Larmore, “e Idea of a Life Plan”, in: Social Philosophy & Policy, 1, no. 
(1999): 96–112; and Martin Seel, “Aktive und passive Selbstbestimmung”, in: Merkur, 
54, no. 7, 2000, 626–632; .W.A. de Wit, “Autonomie voorbij ascese en assertiviteit”, 
in Humanistiek no. 30 (July 2007): 88–96.
69 Larmore, “e Idea of a life Plan”, p. 97–98.
70 But see especially: Georges Bataille, Oeuvres Complètes, Gallimard: Paris, 1973, Part 
VIII, “La souveraineté”, p. 243–453.
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considerations concerning the one-sidedness of thinking in terms of a “life 
plan”, Larmore here takes a quote from Proust: “In exchange for what our 
imagination leads us to expect (…) life gives us something which we could 
never have imagined.”71
is idea of authenticity as openness towards what is impossible et pourtant 
là (“impossible yet there”) (Bataille), is not aicted by the shadow side 
of narcissism and subjectivism, rather, it breaks through it. However, 
according to Bataille, a social and political failure to recognize humanity’s 
sovereign side and the aspect of “unproductive living” could result in 
sovereignty assuming destructive and catastrophic forms – of which the 
outrageous lyrics of the Sex Pistols’ take on My Way (today I killed a cat, but 
dare I say, I did it my way …) is but a tame example, with suicide cults and 
snu pornography more towards the other end of the spectrum. Bataille 
himself saw the roots of a morality of sovereignty already in the words of 
the Gospel: “Look at the birds of the eld” (Mt 6:26) Here, as prompted by 
Taylor, the conversation on true authenticity needs to be continued.
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